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Abstract* 
The reduction of non-tariff measures (NTMs) has become the key policy variable to evaluate modern 
and deep free trade agreements (FTAs), such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP). In this chapter we overview the two main approaches to estimating NTM reductions associated 
with the implementation of FTAs. We then detail how these reductions are estimated in different impact 
assessment studies of TTIP, we compare and analyse the main differences in these estimations and how 
they affect the overall economic impact of TTIP. We find that accounting for differences in the expected 
NTM reductions can explain a large share of the discrepancies regarding the overall potential economic 
effects between different impact assessments of TTIP. 
Keywords 
Non-tariff measures, trade cost estimations, gravity models, CGE models, quantitative trade models, 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
                                                     
* The opinions expressed in this article should be attributed to its author. They are not meant to represent the positions or 
opinions of the WTO and its members and are without prejudice to Members’ rights and obligations under the WTO. Any 
errors are attributable to the authors. 
1 Introduction
Many recent free trade agreements (FTAs) are deep or comprehensive agreements
that contain a large number of provisions on non-tariﬀ measures (NTMs). This
contrasts with the traditional shallow trade agreements that focused mainly on tariﬀ
reductions. Therefore, one the main tasks of trade economists asked to predict the
welfare eﬀects of deep FTAs is to translate the NTM-provisions into overall welfare
eﬀects. This can be achieved in two steps. First, the particular NTM-provisions
need to be translated into trade cost reductions, and second, welfare eﬀects of the
trade cost reductions are calculated with a general equilibrium model.
In this chapter we provide a detailed overview of the diﬀerent approaches to
calculate the trade cost reductions of NTM-provisions in FTAs and their associated
welfare eﬀects. Moreover, we focus our analysis on diﬀerent impact assessment
studies over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between
the US and the EU. In the diﬀerent studies three types of reductions in trade costs
are identiﬁed: ﬁrst, a reduction or full elimination of tariﬀs; second, a reduction in
NTMs between the EU and the US; and third, a reduction in NTMs between the
EU and the US with third countries as a result of regulatory harmonisation –the
so-called spillover eﬀects.
We distinguish between the two main approaches to calculate the reductions in
NTMs: the bottom-up approach and the top-down approach. The bottom-up ap-
proach identiﬁes the NTMs already in place between FTA partners and speciﬁes
scenarios for the expected trade cost reductions associated with this speciﬁc FTA.
The top-down approach estimates the trade cost reductions from past FTAs, im-
posing that the expected trade cost reductions of the speciﬁc FTA in case, will be
similar as in comparable agreements from the past. In general, most studies use the
concept of ad valorem equivalent (AVE) of an NTM, which is the equivalent ad val-
orem trade cost for a particular NTM. Some studies allow for diﬀerences in expected
overall AVE trade cost reductions conditional on the depth level of the agreement.
Some studies account separately for the reductions in tariﬀs and NTMs, whereas
other studies do not explicitly model tariﬀs, calculating the expected overall AVE
trade costs reductions associated with TTIP without distinguishing between tariﬀs
and NTMs.
We start this chapter with an outline of the diﬀerent approaches to the estimation
of trade cost reductions associated with NTM provisions in FTAs in Section 2. Then
we introduce the diﬀerent TTIP impact assessment studies in Section 3, while in
Section 4 we compare the predicted trade cost reductions for all studies. In Section
5 we then explore the impact of trade cost reductions on predicted welfare eﬀects,
the inﬂuence of the employed trade elasticities and we discuss the sensitivity of the
results to diﬀerent modelling assumptions. We conclude in Section 6.
1
2 Calculating NTM reductions associated with FTAs
Since tariﬀ levels are low for many countries negotiating deep FTAs like TPP, TTIP
and CETA, the largest impact in these agreements will come from changes in NTMs.
Thus, the proper estimation of expected trade cost reductions associated with pro-
visions on NTMs has become a critical element for assessing the potential economic
impacts of modern FTAs. To determine the welfare eﬀects of deep FTAs with provi-
sions on NTMs, researchers ﬁrst have to calculate the associated reductions in trade
costs. In this section we explain the two approaches to map the NTM provisions
into associated reductions in trade costs. Before discussing the two approaches to
calculating the trade cost reductions, we ﬁrst point out how NTMs are modelled as
trade costs.
2.1 Modelling trade costs caused by NTMs
The typical approach in the literature is to assume that NTMs generate resource-
dissipating costs. Firms have to spend resources -i.e. time, working hours, ﬁnancial
resources– to comply with diﬀerences in national regulations and with barriers to
trade. Such resource-dissipating costs are modelled in international trade using the
concept of iceberg trade costs, where a fraction of goods "melts away" in transit
from one country to another, and this fraction corresponds with the resources used
or dissipated to deal with the particular NTM.
More formally, denoting iceberg trade costs for goods exported from i to j as τij ,
means that τij units have to be exported by country i to deliver one unit in country
of destination j. Hence, τij − 1 units are lost or "melted away" when transporting
the good. The implication is that the cost of selling a good from i to j is given by
τijci, where ci is the marginal cost of production in exporter i.
We deﬁne iceberg trade costs without any NTMs in place as τnoNTMij = 1 + Cij ,
where Cij encompasses all trade costs except for tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ measures,
such as international transport costs and other costs related to distance, language,
and other barriers to trade. Iceberg trade costs inclusive of an NTM are deﬁned as
τNTMij = (1 + Cij)(1 + AV ENTMij ), where AV ENTMij is the ad valorem equivalent
of an NTM, a concept often used to express the size of trade costs associated with
an NTM. The AVE of an NTM is deﬁned as the percentage increase in trade costs
because of the NTM being present:
AV ENTMij =
τNTMij
τnoNTMij
− 1 (1)
To calculate the AVE of an NTM, the empirical literature has employed two
methods (Berden and Francois, 2015). First, the price-based method relates the price
diﬀerence between countries to NTMs, controlling for other observable variables and
ﬁxed eﬀects. Second, the value-based method estimates a gravity equation relating
the value of trade between countries to NTMs, controlling again for other observable
variables and ﬁxed eﬀects. Since all studies on TTIP discussed in this chapter employ
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value-based methods, we explain how the iceberg trade costs associated with an
NTM, τNTMij , can be calculated with this method.
Starting with a generic theoretical gravity equation, the bilateral trade value
between country i and j inclusive of bilateral tariﬀs, Vij , can be expressed as follows:1
Vij =
((1 + tij) τij)−θ YiEj
ΠiΩj
(2)
where tij is the ad-valorem tariﬀ rate, Yi the total output of exporter i, Ej is total
expenditures in country j, θ is the trade elasticity, and Πi and Ωj are the outward
and inward multilateral resistance terms, respectively. The outward term denotes
the attractiveness for exporter i to export to other destinations, and the inward term
expresses the attractiveness for importer j to import from other sources. Failure to
control for multilateral resistance leads to omitted variable bias (cf. Yotov et al.,
2016).
From the theoretical formulation in Equation (2), the empirical gravity speciﬁ-
cation can be written as:
Vij = exp
(
β′Cij − θ ln (1 + tij) + γc lnNTM cij + γdNTMdij + ηi + νj
)
εij (3)
NTMs can consist of both continuous variables, NTM cij , which are included in logs
in the estimation and discrete variables, NTMdij , which are included in levels. Cij
is captured by the standard gravity bilateral variables aﬀecting the value of trade
(e.g. distance, tariﬀs, common border, common language and colonial past). ηi and
νj are the exporter and importer ﬁxed eﬀects and εij is an error term.
Comparing Equations (2) and (3), we see that iceberg trade costs can be written
as τij = exp
(
−β′Cij+γc ln NTMij+γdNTMijθ
)
.2 We can now deﬁne the AVE of an NTM
–i.e. the percentage change in iceberg trade costs as a result of the presence of this
NTM– for both continuous and discrete variables. For continuous variables the AVE
of an NTM is deﬁned as the percentage change in iceberg trade costs as a result of
increasing the NTM-variable by 1%:
AV ENTM
c
ij =
d ln τij
d lnNTM cij
(4)
If the NTMij is a dummy variable, the associated AVE is deﬁned as the change in
iceberg trade costs by switching the value of the NTM-dummy (NTMij) from 0 to
1:
AV ENTM
d
ij =
τij
∣∣∣NTMdij = 1 − τij ∣∣∣NTMdij = 0
τij
∣∣∣NTMdij = 0 (5)
1As shown by Head and Mayer (2014) many theoretical trade models can be expresses using this
generic gravity equation.
2When running simulations the importer and exporter ﬁxed eﬀects in the theoretical gravity
equations will change as a result of changing the values of the NTM variable, but this does not
aﬀect the calculation of the change in iceberg trade costs as a result of the NTM.
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We can determine the two AVEs by combining the theoretical gravity equation in
(2) with the empirical gravity equation in (3). This gives:
d lnVij
d lnNTM cij
= d lnVij
d ln τij
d ln τij
d lnNTM cij
(6)
Vij
∣∣∣NTMdij = 1
Vij
∣∣∣NTMdij = 0 − 1 =
⎛
⎝τij
∣∣∣NTMdij = 1
τij
∣∣∣NTMdij = 0
⎞
⎠
−θ
= exp (γd) (7)
The expressions for the AVEs as deﬁned in equations (4)-(5) can now easily be
written as follows:
AV ENTM
c
ij = −
γc
θ
(8)
AV ENTM
d
ij = exp
(
−γd
θ
)
− 1 (9)
Equation (3) shows that the coeﬃcient on tariﬀs can be employed to identify the
trade elasticity θ, used in the counterfactual experiments. This procedure is followed
in some of the TTIP studies (Francois et al., 2013; Egger et al., 2015; Aichele et al.,
2014).
Of course equation (8) is an approximation which becomes increasingly poor
when the change in the continuous NTM-measure (entered in logs in the gravity
equation) becomes large. In that case we can better use the exact expression for
the change in the NTM-measure of a continuous measure, from the old to the new
level, so from NTM c,0ij to NTM
c,1
ij and denoted by AV EΔNTM
c
ij . For completeness
we also deﬁne the AV E associated with the change in a discrete variable (entered
in levels in the gravity equation) from NTMd,0ij to NTM
d,1
ij , AV EΔNTM
d
ij :
AV EΔNTM
c
ij =
τij
∣∣∣NTM cij = NTM c,1ij
τij
∣∣∣NTM cij = NTM c,0ij − 1 = exp
⎛
⎜⎜⎝−
γc ln NTM
c,1
ij
NTMc,0ij
θ
⎞
⎟⎟⎠− 1 =
(
NTM c,1ij
NTM c,0ij
) γc
θ
− 1
(10)
AV EΔNTM
d
ij =
τij
∣∣∣NTMdij = NTMd,1ij
τij
∣∣∣NTMdij = NTMd,0ij − 1 =
exp
(
−γ
dNTMd,1ij
θ
)
exp
(
−γ
dNTMd,0ij
θ
) − 1 (11)
Some studies calculate the percentage change in iceberg trade costs using an
approximation. The relative change in the value of trade as a result of changing a
zero/one variable like NTM is written as follows:3
∂ lnVij
∂NTMdij
= ∂ lnVij
∂ ln τij
∂ ln τij
∂NTMdij
(12)
3Our notation is somewhat loose here, since NTMdij is a discrete variable. Formally, we should
write AV ENTM
d,appr
ij =
τij |NTMdij=1−τij |NTMdij=0
τij
∣∣NTMd
ij
=0
.
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From the gravity equation in (3) we have:
∂ lnVij
∂NTMij
= exp (γd) − 1 (13)
Combining equations (12)-(13) gives for the percentage change in iceberg trade costs:
∂ ln τij
∂NTMij
= −exp (γd) − 1
θ
(14)
The exact change in iceberg trade costs instead is given in equation (9). For larger
values of γ, equation (14) becomes an increasingly poor approximation of the exact
expression in equation (17). For example with γ = 1.21 and θ = 7, we would ﬁnd
a percentage change in τij of −33.6% instead of the −15.9% based on equation (9).
Kee et al. (2009) use equation (14) to calculate the AVE of NTMs. The AVE of
an NTM is deﬁned as the percentage change in iceberg trade costs, thus implicitly
assuming that iceberg trade costs without the NTMs are equal to one. Since the
level of trade costs without NTMs is unknown, this is a natural normalisation. But
as we have shown with our numerical example, equation (14) is an approximation
and it seems better to use equation (9) to calculate the gravity-inferred AVE.
2.2 Two approaches to calculate NTM-related trade cost reduc-
tions
The previous subsection has equipped us with the necessary tools to understand the
diﬀerences between the two approaches to calculate the reduction in trade costs as a
result of NTM provisions in FTAs: the bottom-up approach and top-down approach.
To compare the expected trade cost reductions in the two approaches, we have to
calculate the ad valorem equivalents of the introduction of an FTA.
2.2.1 Bottom-up approach
The bottom-up approach ﬁrst calculates the size of NTMs already in place between
FTA partners and then makes assumptions, or speciﬁes scenarios, to infer the po-
tential reductions in NTMs that can be expected from the implementation of that
particular FTA. So, these studies start with initial levels of AVEs associated with
current NTMs in place, and then impose scenarios for the percentage reductions in
these NTMs or the AVEs of the NTMs as a result of the conclusion of an FTA.
Oftentimes the size of NTMs is estimated at the sector-level using detailed micro
data –i.e. ﬁrm-level surveys and product-level data, and sometimes in combination
with expert opinion. For instance, Francois et al. (2013) infer the size of NTMs based
on business surveys with about 5,500 data points. These data are mapped into AVEs
by estimating sector-level gravity equations. Fontagné et al. (2013) estimate the size
of NTMs in goods based on product level data from the UNCTAD-TRAINS database
for NTMs in goods, and estimate the size of NTMs in services at the sector level
based on importer ﬁxed eﬀects in each country relative to a benchmark country with
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the lowest level of NTMs judged by the amount of trade (Fontagné et al., 2011).
In Section 3.2 we provide a detailed explanation of the speciﬁc estimations used in
both papers.
To compare the bottom-up studies with the top-down studies we have to calculate
the implied AVE of the FTA based on the AVEs of NTMs in place and scenarios for
the reductions in these NTMs. We can do this in two ways, using either assumed
percentage reductions in NTMs or assumed percentage reductions in the AVEs of
NTMs. The ﬁrst approach to calculate the AVEs of an FTA in bottom up studies
can be chosen when NTM-levels have been calculated based on gravity estimation
and all estimation details are available. We can then apply equations (10)-(11)
imposing a percentage reduction in the NTM from NTMd0ij to NTMd1ij . We see
that for calculation of the associated AVE, AV EΔNTMdij in case of a discrete NTM
measure, we need the estimated coeﬃcients and trade elasticities, respectively γd
and θ.
The second approach to infer the AVEs of an FTA based on bottom-up studies
can be followed when only initial AVEs of NTMs are available and scenarios for the
percentages by which these AVEs are reduced. Deﬁning the initial level of AV E
in the bottom-up studies as AV ENTM,NO−FTAij and a percentage change in these
AVEs as pc_AV EFTAij =
AV ENTM,FTAij −AV ENTM,NO−FTAij
AV ENTM,NO−FTAij
, (in the CEPR and CEPII
studies for example typically 25%), we can calculate AVE of the FTA, AV EFTAij ,
(so the percentage change in iceberg trade costs) as:
AV EFTAij =
τFTAij − τNO−FTAij
τNO−FTAij
=
1 + AV ENTM,FTAij − 1 + AV ENTM,NO−FTAij
1 + AV ENTM,NO−FTAij
=
AV ENTM,NO−FTAij
1 + AV ENTM,NO−FTAij
pc_AV EFTAij (15)
For example, an initial AVE of 9.3% and a reduction by 25% as in the CEPR
study for services in the EU leads to a percentage reduction in iceberg trade costs
of 2.1%, 9.3109.325% = 2.1%.
A somewhat diﬀerent version of the bottom-up approach can be found in the
study on the eﬀects of Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership (TPP) by Ciuriak et al. (2016). This
is an ex-ante study of the expected eﬀects of TPP that is based on the negotiated
treaty text to infer expected trade cost reductions.4 In particular, this study maps
the TPP treaty text into trade cost indicators such as the OECD’s services trade
restrictiveness index (STRI). Hence, they identify provisions in the text that lead
to changes in trade cost indicators, controlling for what has been dubbed as "legal
inﬂation" – i.e. provisions in treaties that do not eﬀectively reduce trade costs (Horn
et al., 2009). These changes in the trade cost indicators can then be mapped into
4In contrast, since negotiations are still ongoing on TTIP, there is still no ﬁnal treaty text that
can be used.
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associated AVEs (so percentage reductions in iceberg trade costs) based on gravity
estimations with these trade cost indicators.
2.2.2 Top-down approach
The top-down approach infers the expected reductions in NTM trade costs exclu-
sively based on gravity estimation. Therefore, this method does not calculate initial
levels of NTMs but determines the trade cost reduction associated with an FTA
directly from a similar speciﬁcation as in Equation (3). In particular, calculating
the iceberg trade costs reductions as a result of an FTA (˜τFTAij ) using the top-down
approach is straightforward: the variable NTMij has to be replaced by FTAij in
Equation (3), to estimate:
Vij = exp
(
β′Cij − θ ln (1 + tij) + δFTAij + λTij + ηi + νj
)
εij (16)
where FTAij can be either a dummy variable that indicates the presence of an FTA
between i and j or an index that determines the "depth" of the FTA between both
countries. Tij are the tariﬀs from Comparing equations (2) and (16), we observe that
iceberg trade costs can be written as τij = exp
(
−β′Cij+δFTAijθ
)
. The associateed
AVE of an FTA can then be calculated based on the change of the FTA-dummy,
FTAij , from 0 to 1:5
AV EFTAij =
τFTAij − τNO−FTAij
τNO−FTAij
= exp
(
−δ
θ
)
− 1 (17)
The coeﬃcient on the FTA variable (δ) assesses by how much FTAs have in-
creased trade in the past and can thus be used to determine the percentage change
reduction in iceberg trade costs as a result of the FTA. Note that in this speciﬁcation
both the tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ measures associated with an FTA are grouped. Some
studies, on the other hand, explicitly include tariﬀ levels in equation (16), which
allows to separately identify the NTM components associated with the implementa-
tion of the FTA. In this case, equation (17) will estimate AV ENTMij –i.e. the AVE
reduction associated only with the NTM provisions in the FTA, independent of any
tariﬀ reductions in the agreement.
As discussed into detail in Section 3.2, the studies using the top-down approach
diﬀer with respect to the level of aggregation of trade data used (sectoral versus
aggregate), whether endogeneity of FTAs is accounted for or not, and whether the
trade elasticities are estimated structurally (from the same gravity equation) or
not. For instance, some studies (Felbermayr et al., 2015, 2013; Carrère et al., 2015)
employ a simple 0-1 FTA dummy, implying that TTIP would generate the same trade
cost reduction between EU countries and the US as FTAs have done on average in
the past. On the other hand, Egger et al. (2015) and Aichele et al. (2014) instead
5Again, the importer and exporter speciﬁc terms will change with diﬀerent FTA values, but this
does not aﬀect the iceberg trade costs estimations.
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consider the depth of an FTA and model TTIP as the move from no FTA to a
deep FTA. Another important diﬀerence is that in the ﬁrst set of studies the trade
elasticity is taken from the literature, whereas in the studies employing the depth
of FTAs the trade elasticities are estimated structurally with the gravity equation.
2.3 Comparing both approaches
When comparing both methodological approaches, there are advantages and draw-
backs from each. On the one hand, the bottom-up approach requires a data-intensive
process (i.e. the use of micro-data and surveys) that provides detailed information
on diﬀerent trade costs associated with NTMs. This process also provides asymmet-
ric bilateral trade cost data, which reﬂects initial country- and sector-speciﬁc trade
cost levels, and thus, the potential for reductions when negotiating FTAs.
On the other hand, the top-down approach can be applied using standard gravity
datasets and econometric speciﬁcations, which makes it a less data and analytical-
intensive process. In addition, when properly speciﬁed, this approach can also inform
about non-observable trade costs that are overlooked by the bottom-up approach.
However, this more straightforward approach also comes at the cost of assuming
symmetric trade cost reductions, which disregard diﬀerent initial NTM values by
country and sector.
3 Overview of studies on TTIP
This section provides a brief introduction to the diﬀerent studies that will be com-
pared in this chapter. In general, the studies can be divided between CGE-based
models and structural gravity (SG) models.6 After this overview, we conduct a more
systematic comparison of the way trade cost reductions are modelled in each TTIP
study.
3.1 General characteristics of the TTIP studies
3.1.1 CEPR Study (Francois et al., 2013)
The most inﬂuential and mostly cited economic analysis of TTIP has been the CEPR
study (Francois et al., 2013) using a CGE-based analysis.7 This study employs
a CGE model to simulate the expected economic impact of TTIP.8 The model’s
main features are intermediate linkages, multiple sectors and production factors,
6See Bekkers and Rojas-Romagosa (2017) for a detailed discussion of the diﬀerences between
both modelling frameworks, and the related TTIP economic eﬀects.
7This is the reference study by the European Commission and DG Trade (cf. European Com-
mission, 2013) and the study discussed by most commentators (see for example The Economist,
2013; Rodrik, 2015; Wolf, 2015; The Guardian, 2015; Mustilli, 2015). The relevance of this study
is highlighted by the request of the European Parliament to conduct an independent evaluation of
this study, which was done by Pelkmans et al. (2014).
8The study uses a variant of the GTAP CGE-model. The main characteristics and references to
the standard GTAP model are detailed in Hertel and Tsigas (1997) and Hertel (2013).
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endogenous capital accumulation, monopolistic competition and the inclusion of in-
ternational transport margins, export subsidies, import tariﬀs and other taxes. The
CEPR study uses the GTAP-8 database (base year 2007), with 20 sectors and 11
regions, where the EU is treated as a single region rather than 28 disaggregated coun-
tries. A baseline scenario for 2027 is then projected by endogenising productivity
growth such that macroeconomic aggregates in the baseline are equal to long-term
GDP projections from the OECD and UN population projections.
The study explores the economy-wide impacts of several TTIP scenarios, of
which reducing tariﬀs and NTMs are the most important. As an outcome of the
CGE analysis, detailed simulation results are provided for expected changes in GDP,
household disposable income, overall aggregate and bilateral export and import
ﬂows, trade diversion eﬀects (from/to intra-EU, US and third-countries), terms-
of-trade, tariﬀ revenues, sectoral output and sectoral trade ﬂows. The sustainability
impact also includes detailed results on changes in wages for high- and low-skill
workers, sectoral employment by skill level, labour displacement measures, changes
in CO2 emissions and land use. Finally, the study provides GDP and trade eﬀects
for third-countries.
3.1.2 CEPII study (Fontagné et al., 2013)
The CEPII study starts with a description of the current trade and investment
relations between the EU and the US. Given the limited average level of the import
tariﬀs between both regions (2% in the US and 3% in the EU), they predict that
these tariﬀs will not be the most important topics in the TTIP negotiations.9 As
with the CEPR study, this study ﬁnds that the corresponding levels of protection
provided by the non-tariﬀ measures are much higher on average than those provided
by the tariﬀs. They also ﬁnd that these diﬀer signiﬁcantly across sectors. Thus, they
state that the signiﬁcant negotiation topics at the macroeconomic level are on non-
tariﬀ measures, regulation in services, public procurement, geographical indication of
origin and investment. They argue that these topics are contentious and provide an
overview of each topic. The sector-speciﬁc trade barriers, together with NTMs and
other contentious topics explain the overall sensitivity of the TTIP negotiations.10
Finally, to assess the macroeconomic eﬀects of TTIP they use the MIRAGE CGE
model (Bchir et al., 2002) that similar to the CGE model in the CEPR study,
provides a broad set of economic outputs.11
9However, they do acknowledge that tariﬀs will be important for some sensitive sectors: for both
the EU and US dairy products, clothing and footwear are sensitive. Furthermore, steel items are
sensitive for the US and meat products for the EU.
10As in other studies reviewed here, they acknowledge that not all of the diﬀerent aspects of the
negotiations can be incorporated into a model.
11This CGE model is also related to the GTAP-class models.
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3.1.3 Egger et al. (2015)
Egger et al. (2015) examine the potential impact of TTIP with a hybrid approach
that combines a CGE economic model with structural estimation of the trade elas-
ticities and the expected trade cost reductions to generate estimates of the welfare
eﬀects for the EU, United States and third countries. The study follows a two-step
approach. In the ﬁrst step a gravity model is employed to yield estimates of reduc-
tions in trade costs. These values are then used as inputs in the second step where
a CGE model simulates the economy-wide eﬀects. This study focuses on and re-
ports largely the same outcome measures as Francois et al. (2013). The CGE model
employed in Egger et al. (2015) is also very similar to the model in Francois et al.
(2013). The main diﬀerence with respect to the CGE application is that Egger et al.
(2015) use the more recent GTAP-9 database with base year 2011 instead of the
older GTAP-8 database with base year 2007.
3.1.4 Felbermayr et al. (2015)
The study by Felbermayr et al. (2015) is a typical structural gravity (SG) appli-
cation based on a one-sector model with both a gravity equation to determine the
trade costs associated with the TTIP experiment and a general equilibrium equa-
tion to calculate the welfare eﬀects, where both equations follow directly from the
theoretical gravity model. Baseline trade costs are calibrated to the ﬁtted/predicted
values of the estimated gravity equation. The paper does not follow the structural
gravity literature in the determination of the parameters of the model, since the
trade elasticity –a crucial parameter in the calculation of the welfare eﬀects– is not
estimated structurally, but is taken from the literature (i.e. Egger et al., 2011; Egger
and Larch, 2011).
3.1.5 Felbermayr et al. (2013)
Felbermayr et al. (2013) explore the eﬀects of TTIP on both trade and welfare and
on the labour market. This is done with two distinct SG models. The ﬁrst model
explores the impact on trade, GDP and welfare for 126 countries, whereas the second
model is limited to 28 countries due to the lack of available labour market data for
more countries. The ﬁrst model is identical to the model employed by Felbermayr
et al. (2015) except for the variables included in the gravity equation.
3.1.6 Aichele et al. (2014)
To date, the study by Aichele et al. (2014) is the most sophisticated SG-based study
on TTIP. These researchers use a multi-country and multi-sector Ricardian trade
model with national and international input-output linkages identical to the model
employed by Caliendo and Parro (2015) to study the impact of tariﬀ reductions as a
result of NAFTA. Counterfactual outcomes are calculated employing so-called exact
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hat-algebra with baseline import shares calibrated to actual import shares as in the
CGE-approach.
3.1.7 Carrère et al. (2015)
Carrère et al. (2015) use a multi-sector SG approach to determine the real wage and
unemployment eﬀects of TTIP by including labour market frictions and equilibrium
unemployment in an Eaton-Kortum-type trade framework. The authors also present
welfare eﬀects based on a weighted average of real wage and unemployment eﬀects.
A salient feature of this study is that the negative unemployment eﬀects dominate
the positive real wage eﬀects in their setup, which generate overall negative welfare
eﬀects in some countries. The negative unemployment eﬀects stem from a realloca-
tion of workers from sectors with less labour market frictions and smaller equilibrium
unemployment to sectors with more labour market frictions and higher equilibrium
unemployment.
3.2 NTM reductions in each TTIP study
In this section we explain how each particular impact assessment study estimates
the associated trade cost reductions from implementing TTIP.
3.2.1 Francois et al. (2013)
Francois et al. (2013) take into account the three types of trade cost reductions
associated with FTAs: tariﬀs, NTMs and spillover eﬀects. To determine the size of
reductions in NTMs as a result of TTIP, this study follows a bottom-up approach,
taking four steps. First, the size of NTMs is inferred from business surveys (with
about 5,500 data points). Firms from a particular country i are asked to rank the
overall restrictiveness of an export market j between 0 and 100. The bilateral indexes
are aggregated per sector to importer j speciﬁc indexes. This aggregated number
deﬁnes the size of NTMs for imports into country j. The import-speciﬁc indexes are
then included in a standard gravity regression –as in Equation (3)– by interacting the
NTM measures with dummies for intra-EU, intra-NAFTA and transatlantic trade.
Actionable NTMs between the EU and the US are then deﬁned as the diﬀerence in
the ad valorem equivalent trade costs of the NTMs (using estimated tariﬀ elasticities
in goods, while for services a trade elasticity of 4 is used) for US-EU trade, intra-
EU trade (NTMs into the EU), for US-EU trade and intra-NAFTA trade (NTMs
into the US). Comparing these trade cost estimates, the actionable NTMs to be
negotiated in TTIP consist of the diﬀerence in costs perceived by businesses surveyed
of importing into an EU country from the US in comparison to importing into the
same EU country from another EU country.
Second, NTMs are divided into two categories: cost-increasing barriers and rent-
creating barriers.12 On the basis of the Ecorys (2009) survey and expert judgement,
12See Box 1 in Francois et al. (2013) for more details.
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on average (across sectors) 60% of the NTMs are cost-increasing. The other 40% of
the claimed increase in prices as a result of NTMs, can be attributed to rents. The
implication of these rents is that with existing NTMs ﬁrms have more market power
and thus set higher prices.13
Third, the study assumes that only a fraction of NTMs can be reduced, as it is
not possible to remove them because of legal, institutional or political constraints.14
It is then assumed that 50% of the ad valorem equivalent of estimated NTMs can
be reduced, or as they term it, are actionable.15
Fourth, as part of the TTIP experiment only a fraction of the actionable share of
NTMs is assumed to be lowered as a result of signing TTIP. Diﬀerent scenarios are
employed, but the baseline scenario has a 50% reduction in the actionable NTMs.
The result of combining the actionability share with the share of actionable NTMs
reduced (both 50%) is that NTMs are expected to fall by 25% with TTIP.
3.2.2 Fontagné et al. (2013)
The CEPII study uses the estimates for NTMs in goods from the study by Kee
et al. (2009) and their own CEPII estimates (Fontagné et al., 2011) for NTM values
in services. Kee et al. (2009) estimate AVE NTMs using a 0-1 dummy variable
on NTMs at a very detailed product (tariﬀ line) level (HS6) using the UNCTAD’s
TRAINS database. To consolidate this information, they then regress import values
per country and tariﬀ line (corrected for endogenous tariﬀs) on the (instrumented)
NTM-dummies, constraining the coeﬃcients to be positive. Thus, their calculations
are based on product-level import equations that consolidate information from sev-
eral sources, in particular, the NTMs already contained in the UNCTAD-TRAINS
database. Finally, trade elasticities are estimated based on the Feenstra (1994) ap-
proach –using identiﬁcation by heteroskedasticity– and these are then used to obtain
the NTM AVE values.
Fontagné et al. (2011) estimate NTMs in services using a residuals method based
on the importer ﬁxed eﬀect in each importer country relative to the importer ﬁxed
eﬀect in a benchmark country with the highest value of predicted trade relative
to actual trade. The importer ﬁxed eﬀect of the benchmark country deﬁnes trade
costs in the most liberalised country and thus, in the country with the largest scope
for trade liberalisation. These estimates generate NTM AVEs of cross-border trade
ﬂows in services for nine services sectors and 65 countries from the GTAP database.
13It is not clear from the description of the simulations whether prices are really reduced by 40%
of the ad valorem equivalent of the actionable NTMs as a result of the TTIP experiment or whether
the 60%/40% cut only serves to determine the share of NTMs that is cost-increasing.
14These limitations in reducing NTMs stem from legal and even constitutional restrictions, po-
litical and consumer sensibilities and technical limitations, among others. See Egger et al. (2015)
for a more detailed discussion on this topic.
15The share is based on expert opinions, cross-checks with regulators, legislators and businesses
opinions taken from the business survey in Ecorys (2009). More details are in Box 1 in Francois
et al. (2013).
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The CEPII study then employ a 25% reduction in their estimated NTM AVE
values, based on the same arguments used in Francois et al. (2013) –i.e. the level of
actionability (50%) times the expected level of NTMs that can be actually negotiated
in TTIP (also 50%).
3.2.3 Felbermayr et al. (2013) and Felbermayr et al. (2015)
Both these studies follow a top-down approach as in Equation (16) separately ac-
counting for tariﬀs and using a dummy variable for FTAs. So instead of calculating
the ad valorem equivalent TTIP with the depth of FTAs, they use a simple zero-one
dummy for all FTAs. The two studies only diﬀer with respect to the number of
countries included in the gravity estimation and the control variables employed.16
The gravity equation is estimated with PPML accounting for endogeneity of FTAs,
based on the approach in Egger et al. (2011). The two studies do not report the
AVEs of their TTIP experiment, since they directly calculate the change in income,
multilateral resistances and welfare as a result of the change in the FTA dummy
from 0 to 1. However, the NTM AVE values can be easily obtained from Equation
(17), using their estimated FTA coeﬃcient (δ) and the employed trade elasticity (θ).
3.2.4 Egger et al. (2015)
This study calculates the reduction of NTMs in goods employing a top-down ap-
proach, while the reduction in NTMs in services is calculated with a bottom-up
approach. To calculate the reductions in NTMs on manufacturing goods, a gravity
equation as in Equation (16) is estimated including the depth of FTAs, while con-
trolling for FTA endogeneity following the approach in Egger and Larch (2011). To
measure the depth of FTAs the authors use the index of the FTA-depth proposed
by Dür et al. (2014) which ranges from 0 to 7, where TTIP is assumed to be a deep
FTA with the maximum value of a FTA-depth of 7.17 Based on the estimated trade
elasticities (δ), the NTM AVEs are calculated as moving from no FTA (index=0) to
a deep FTA (index=7).
The AVEs of trade restrictions in services are taken from Jafari and Tarr (2015)
based on the World Bank’s STRI database (Borchert et al., 2014). Both for manu-
facturing goods and services the remaining steps are the same as in Francois et al.
(2013). Hence, NTMs are split up into cost-increasing and rent-generating NTMs
and only the share of actionable NTMs are assumed to be reduced under TTIP. In
this study the share of cost-increasing NTMs is again 50%, but in contrast to the
CEPR study, the share of actionable NTMs is assumed to be now 100% (instead of
50%), which is consistent with the presumption that TTIP will be a deep FTA. On
the other hand, the share of actionable NTMs in services varies by scenario. In one
16The exact approach in Felbermayr et al. (2013) can be found by consulting the companion
study (Felbermayr et al., 2013a).
17In terms of the coding of FTA-depth this means that the FTA should contain provisions on all
seven topics identiﬁed by Dür et al. (2014).
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scenario there is no reduction in services NTMs and in the other scenario NTMs for
non-ﬁnancial services fall by 50%.
3.2.5 Aichele et al. (2014)
NTM reductions in this study are deﬁned as a reduction in iceberg trade costs
calculated using a top-down approach and separately accounting for tariﬀ eﬀects. A
gravity model following Equation (16) is estimated including dummies for shallow
and deep FTAs. A shallow FTAs is deﬁned as an FTA with a score between 0
and 3 in the FTA depth index from Dür et al. (2014), and a deep FTAs is deﬁned
as an FTA with an index between 4 and 7. The FTA dummies are instrumented
by employing a measure for trade contagion proposed by Baldwin and Jaimovich
(2012). To determine the reduction in overall iceberg trade costs for goods this
study uses the estimated trade elasticities, whereas for services a trade elasticity of
5.9 is used, based on estimates from Egger et al. (2012). Then they assume that
the AVE NTM reductions associated with TTIP can be calculated by shifting their
FTA-dummy deﬁnition from 0 (shallow FTA) to 1 (deep FTA).
3.2.6 Carrère et al. (2015)
This study accounts for reductions in NTMs following the top-down approach in
Equation (16) with a 0-1 FTA dummy and separately estimating the eﬀect of tariﬀs.
Although they use data on 35 sectors for their SG model, the gravity equation is
estimated by pooling all sectors. Thus, this study estimate a single trade elasticity
of 3.17 and a coeﬃcient on the FTA-dummy of 0.52. Hence, despite having data at
the sectoral level, only an aggregate NTM trade cost reduction is calculated.
4 Comparison of trade cost reductions between studies
In this section we do quantitative comparisons of the explicit and implicit trade
cost values employed in each TTIP study and explain why there are signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in these estimations between studies. First, we explain diﬀerences in
trade cost estimations when using the gravity model, and then we compare the
iceberg trade cost reductions in each study.
4.1 Comparing trade cost estimations using the gravity estimations
The TTIP studies can be compared quantitatively based on the AVEs of the intro-
duction of TTIP (or phrased diﬀerently the percentage reduction in iceberg trade
costs as a result of implementing TTIP), AV EFTAij =
τFTAij
τNO−FTAij
− 1. For example,
from Felbermayr et al. (2013) and Felbermayr et al. (2015) we can directly calculate
the percentage change in iceberg trade costs using equation (17) with δ the coef-
ﬁcient on the FTA dummy and θ the assumed trade elasticity. A trade elasticity
of 7 in the baseline and estimates of δ of respectively 1.24 and 1.21 generate the
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numbers displayed in Table 1.1819 For the bottom-up studies we employ the initial
levels of AVEs of NTMs reported in the studies and apply percentage reductions in
these AVEs. For services in the EU in the Egger et al. study for example, we apply
the formula in equation (15) on an initial AVE of 17.6% and a 25% in the AVE (see
Table 1) would lead to an AVE of TTIP of AV Eser,EggerTTIP = 0.1761.176 ∗−25% = −7.5%.20
4.2 Ad valorem equivalents of the introduction of TTIP in diﬀerent
studies
To make the TTIP experiment comparable across studies we report the AVE as a
result of TTIP in Table 1. The bottom-up studies (Francois et al., 2013; Fontagné
et al., 2013) report initial levels of NTMs and assume that the NTMs will be reduced
by a fraction of the initial level. The top-down studies report the eﬀect of (deep)
FTAs on trade ﬂows in gravity estimations. In Subsection 4.1 we have discussed how
the AVEs (percentage reductions in iceberg trade costs) of TTIP can be calculated
with the two approaches. For the studies reporting trade cost reductions at sectoral
levels, we calculate a weighted average for the three main sectors –agriculture, man-
ufactures and services– based on more disaggregated sub-sectors. The weights are
given by the amount of trade from the EU to the US for US NTMs and from the
US to the EU for EU NTMs (using trade data from the GTAP-9 database).
The weighted iceberg trade cost reductions reported in Table 1 show that the
diﬀerences are large, ranging from 2.5% reduction in trade costs in Francois et al.
(2013) to 16.2% in Felbermayr et al. (2013). In addition, Table 1 shows that services
trade contributes relatively little to the overall reduction in trade costs. Given that
services trade is only about 6% of total bilateral trade between the two regions,
its contribution to the total trade cost reduction is also small. In general we ﬁnd
that the studies working with a bottom-up approach based on micro-data on NTMs
(Fontagné et al., 2013; Francois et al., 2013) come to smaller trade cost reductions
than the top-down approaches based on average FTA eﬀects (the rest of the studies).
Both approaches are subject to criticism. In the bottom up approach the share of
NTMs that will be reduced as a result of TTIP is hard to motivate and a percentage
like 25% or 50% always seems somewhat arbitrary. Furthermore, NTM data are often
of poor quality with negative estimated AVEs for many products. The top-down
approach, on the other hand, can be criticised for the fact that it is debatable whether
TTIP will create similar NTM eﬀects as in past deep-FTAs. Moreover, modellers
18See Table 3 in Felbermayr et al. (2015) and Table II.2 in Felbermayr et al. (2013a).
19To calculate the average AVEs in Aichele et al. (2014) we can use the same methodology but we
need to do some additional calculations, since the authors report diﬀerent estimated trade elasticities
and deep FTA dummies for more than 30 sectors. In particular, we ﬁrst calculated the percentage
changes in iceberg trade costs for the diﬀerent sectors based on the estimated tariﬀ elasticities and
the coeﬃcients for shallow and deep FTAs (in Tables 1 and 2 in Aichele et al. (2014)) and then
calculated the weighted average AVEs for agriculture, manufacturing and services. We calculate
AVEs per sector using the following formula, τFTA
τNO−FTA − 1 = exp
(
−βshallow+βdeep
θ
)
− 1.
207.5% deviates from the 6.7% reported in Table 1 because the numbers in the table are based
on trade-weighted average AVEs of TTIP.
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Table 1: Trade-weighted average percentage iceberg trade cost reductions
TTIP experiment: percentage
AVE NTM initial levels change iceberg trade costs
Weighted averages EU USA both regions EU USA both regions
CEPR study Overall 10.6 14.3 12.5 -2.3 -2.8 -2.5
Agriculture/Primary - - - - - -
Manufacturing 11.9 16.3 14.3 -2.5 -3.1 -2.8
Services 9.3 10.0 9.7 -2.1 -2.1 -2.1
Egger et al., 2015 Overall 16.5 16.5 16.5 -12.4 -13.6 -13.0
Agriculture/Primary 15.9 15.9 15.9 -15.9 -15.9 -15.9
Manufacturing 15.9 17.0 16.5 -15.9 -17.0 -16.5
Services 17.6 15.4 16.6 -6.7 -6.0 -6.4
CEPII study Overall 38.8 37.0 37.9 -6.5 -7.7 -7.1
Agriculture/Primary 48.2 51.3 48.8 -8.1 -8.5 -8.3
Manufacturing 42.8 32.3 37.0 -7.5 -6.1 -6.9
Services 32.0 47.3 39.0 -6.1 -8.0 -7.1
Aichele et al., 2014 Overall -12.7 -13.8 -13.2
Agriculture/Primary -52.5 -52.5 -52.5
Manufacturing -16.5 -17.6 -17.1
Services -5.2 -4.6 -4.9
Felbermayr et al., 2013 Overall -16.2 -16.2 -16.2
Felbermayr et al., 2015 Overall -15.9 -15.9 -15.9
Carrere, 2015 Overall -15.1 -15.1 -15.1
Sources: Own estimations based on NTMs and trade cost reductions estimates from referred
studies and bilateral sector-speciﬁc US-EU trade data from the GTAP-9 database.
need to pay attention to estimation details of choosing the proper instrument, the
correct FTA measure and the adequate functional form of the gravity equation
(PPML).21
Comparing the studies within the two groups reveals that the CEPII study gen-
erates much larger NTM levels than the CEPR study. Furthermore, it is encouraging
that the average trade cost reduction in the study by Aichele et al. (2014) is similar
to the reduction in Egger et al. (2015), given that a similar methodology was used.
Both studies calculate the impact of a move from no FTA to a deep FTA based on
the same depth of FTA data. The diﬀerence is the operationalisation. Egger et al.
(2015) maintain the 0-7 scale, whereas Aichele et al. (2014) convert this scale into
two dummies, one for shallow FTAs and one for deep FTAs. For the agriculture
sectors, nonetheless, there are notable diﬀerences, where Aichele et al. (2014) ﬁnd
much larger trade cost reductions than Egger et al. (2015). There are three im-
portant diﬀerences between the two gravity estimates. First the instruments used
are diﬀerent. Second, the estimation method diﬀers: PPML in Egger et al. (2015)
21All studies using the top down approach account for endogeneity of FTAs, although in a diﬀerent
way. All studies estimate the gravity equation using PPML, except for Aichele et al. (2014) who
use Instrumental Variables (IV).
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versus IV in Aichele et al. (2014). Finally, Egger et al. (2015) include a separate
dummy for trade between EU members, thereby driving down the coeﬃcient on the
FTA-depth variable.
To summarise, it is diﬃcult to give a value judgement on the expected trade cost
reductions corresponding with TTIP. However, given the limitations on their estima-
tion techniques, we consider that the approximately 16% NTM reductions reported
in Felbermayr et al. (2013) and Felbermayr et al. (2015) seem over-estimated. In
particular, these studies do not account for the depth of FTAs and assume that TTIP
will be similar to any average FTA in the past. This is an unrealistic assumption
since most FTAs have strongly focused on relatively large tariﬀ reductions in the
past, but these are not possible within TTIP given the relatively low existing tariﬀ
levels. Furthermore, the eﬀect of TTIP seems to rise signiﬁcantly by not including a
separate dummy for intra-EU trade. Carrère et al. (2015), moreover, do not account
for the depth of FTAs and fail to correct for the endogeneity of FTAs. Therefore,
we conclude that a reasonable lower bound for the average trade cost reduction as
a result of TTIP is the 3% values in Francois et al. (2013) and a reasonable upper
bound is the 13% values in Egger et al. (2015) and Aichele et al. (2014).
5 Relation between trade cost reductions and the ex-
pected economic eﬀects of TTIP
In this section we ﬁrst summarise the main economic eﬀects from each study, using
the welfare eﬀects (i.e. real GDP and income changes) as our comparison variable.22
We then relate the discrepancies in these overall economic eﬀects to the trade cost
reductions assumed in each study.
5.1 Expected welfare eﬀects from TTIP
5.1.1 CEPR Study (Francois et al., 2013)
The main economic ﬁnding from the CEPR study is that an ambitious and compre-
hensive transatlantic trade and investment agreement could bring positive economic
gains for both regions of 0.4% of real GDP for the US and 0.5% for the EU, when
comparing the baseline GDP level in 2027 with the simulated GDP level after the
TTIP. EU exports to the US are expected to increase by 28%, while total exports
increase 6% in the EU and 8% in the US. Other scenarios are also evaluated, were
results are expected to be lower than an ambitious TTIP agreement.
5.1.2 CEPII study (Fontagné et al., 2013)
In general, the expected economic eﬀects of TTIP in the CEPII study are similar to
those of the CEPR study. As in the CEPR study, around 80% of the expected trade
22See Bekkers and Rojas-Romagosa (2017) for a comprehensive analytical and quantitative com-
parison of these studies.
17
Non-tariff Measure Estimations in Different Impact Assessments
expansion would stem from lowered non-tariﬀ measures. Overall, both regions will
obtain non-negligible GDP and real income eﬀects, in the long run, of around 0.3%.
Results for alternative scenarios are presented as well, ﬁrst distinguishing between
the eﬀects of tariﬀ elimination and NTM reductions, second using the Ecorys (2009)
NTM levels as reference and third including third country spillover eﬀects from
regulatory harmonisation.
5.1.3 Egger et al. (2015)
The main economic result from the scenario that includes tariﬀ elimination and
reduction in NTMs in goods is that estimated gains in real income are situated
between 1% and 2.25% for the United States and EU, respectively.
The bilateral trade growth in this paper (80%) is much higher than in the CEPR
study (28%). Correspondingly, the real income eﬀects are also higher now (about
four times the results in the CEPR study). The main reason for the higher bilateral
trade is that NTMs were estimated diﬀerently –as explained above.23
5.1.4 Felbermayr et al. (2015)
Felbermayr et al. (2015) come to relatively large welfare eﬀects of TTIP. They ﬁnd
that TTIP can yield real income gains for the EU of 3.9% and 4.9% for the US.24
They also report robustness checks, and in particular, they calculate the welfare
eﬀects employing the average FTA coeﬃcient of 0.36 reported in the literature sur-
vey by Head and Mayer (2010). As a result the welfare eﬀects are much smaller.
Switching oﬀ the extensive margin channel hardly changes the eﬀects since the esti-
mated coeﬃcient of the FTA dummy in the selection equation (i.e. whether there is
trade or not) is small. Finally they also evaluate the eﬀect of including the spillover
eﬀects, which magniﬁes the positive welfare eﬀects as in other studies.
5.1.5 Felbermayr et al. (2013)
This study ﬁnds the largest welfare eﬀects of all the studies. For instance, for the
USA and Great Britain this study estimates an increase in welfare (i.e. equivalent
variation) of 13.4% and 9.7%, while the average welfare increase in the EU is about
8%. Also remarkable are the welfare losses of third countries (9.5% in Canada, 7.2%
in Mexico and 7.4% in Australia).25
23Egger et al. (2015) also have more recent data on NTMs in services and have a pessimistic (no
real changes in trade in services) and optimistic perspective (real changes in all services sectors but
ﬁnance).
24This study does not report changes in trade ﬂows and focuses exclusively on welfare eﬀects.
25It is unclear, however, why the welfare eﬀects are so large in comparison to the CGE studies, but
also in comparison to similar studies (i.e. Felbermayr et al., 2015). Bekkers and Rojas-Romagosa
(2017) presents an extensive comparison of TTIP , which can explain these discrepancies.
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5.1.6 Aichele et al. (2014)
This paper ﬁnds that TTIP will generate real per capita income changes of 2.1% for
the EU and 2.7% for the US. These gains are achieved through strong bilateral trade
increases of 171% (from the USA to the EU) and 216% (from the EU to the USA),
spurred mainly by NTM reductions. Interestingly, the real income eﬀects from this
study are somewhat larger –and the trade ﬂows more than double– than those in
Egger et al. (2015) even though the trade cost reductions are similar in both studies.
5.1.7 Carrère et al. (2015)
This study report eﬀects of TTIP on real wages, unemployment and welfare. Welfare
is a weighted average of the real wage and unemployment. Since we only use real
income as our comparison variable, we do not take into account their unemployment
eﬀects.26 In particular, we use their real wage eﬀects as the main welfare variable
from this study. The authors ﬁnd positive but relatively small real wage eﬀects of
0.3% in the USA and on average 0.2% in the EU.
5.2 Impact of estimated trade cost reductions on predicted welfare
eﬀects
The diﬀerent studies discussed in this chapter all map the estimated trade cost
reductions as a result of TTIP into projected welfare eﬀects. This is done employing
either CGE-models or structural gravity models. In Bekkers and Rojas-Romagosa
(2017) we compare these two approaches and also evaluate the impact of diﬀerences
in model structure on predicted welfare eﬀects. Here we limit ourselves to evaluating
the impact of variation in trade cost reductions on predicted welfare eﬀects with a
ﬂexible CGE-model, also evaluating the impact of variation in trade elasticities.27
Figure 1 displays the percentage change in welfare in the EU as a function of
percentage changes in iceberg trade costs between the EU and the US for three
values of the trade elasticity, θ = 3, θ = 5, and θ = 7. The ﬁgure shows that for
the intermediate value of the trade elasticity of 5, reported as the median value in
Head and Mayer (2014), welfare gains from reductions in iceberg trade costs rise
more than proportionally with the reduction in iceberg trade costs. For example, a
doubling of the reduction in trade costs from 4% to 8% raises the welfare gains from
0.2% to more than 0.4%. The ﬁgure shows furthermore that the relation is convex,
i.e. at larger trade costs the impact of a change in iceberg trade costs becomes
larger.
From the ﬁgure we can also draw clear conclusions on the impact of the size
of the trade elasticity on the welfare eﬀects of reductions in iceberg trade costs
between FTA partners. At larger trade elasticities the eﬀect of reductions in trade
costs becomes larger and the diﬀerence rises with the size of the trade cost shock.
26These are analysed in detail in Bekkers and Rojas-Romagosa (2017).
27The speciﬁc model employed is a simpliﬁed CGE version that is closer to the structural gravity
models. For a detailed description see Bekkers and Rojas-Romagosa (2017).
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Figure 1: Welfare changes in the EU as a function of changes in iceberg trade costs
̂τNTMij for various values of the trade elasticity
Source: Own calculations with ﬂexible CGE-model as described in Hertel and Tsigas (1997),
Hertel (2013), and Bekkers et al. (2017)
For example, for a trade cost reduction of 14%, the predicted welfare gain for the
EU is only about 0.8% with a trade elasticity of 3 and about 1.2% with a trade
elasticity of 7. These ﬁndings seem at odds with the result in the literature on the
welfare gains from trade (Arkolakis et al. (2012)) that the welfare gains from trade
are larger at a smaller trade elasticity, corresponding with the intuition that love-
of-variety forces are stronger at a lower trade elasticity, making it more valuable to
be able to import. Their result, however, is about the welfare gains from trade and
not from trade liberalisation. We have seen in Figure 1 that a larger trade elasticity
raises the gains from trade liberalisation, because trade responses are bigger in this
case.
However, since the top-down AVE trade cost reduction estimation requires the
speciﬁcation of a trade elasticity (see Equation (1), then the overall estimated iceberg
trade costs are conditional on the trade elasticity. In particular, a higher trade
elasticity results in lower iceberg trade costs. Therefore, the relation between welfare
eﬀects, trade cost reductions and trade elasticities are conditional on how the trade
costs are associated (or not) with particular trade elasticity values.
5.3 Spillover eﬀects
Another importance source of divergencies in estimated trade cost reductions comes
from the so-called spillover eﬀects –i.e. changes in trade costs in third countries
that are related to the NTM reductions between the TTIP partners. These spillover
eﬀects were ﬁrst introduced in the discussion on TTIP by Francois et al. (2013),
distinguishing between direct and indirect spillovers. Direct spillovers occur when
third countries ﬁnd it less-costly to export to the EU and the US as a result of
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TTIP. Indirect spillovers take place when third countries partially take over the
harmonised standards in the EU and US, resulting in lower trade costs between third-
countries and for exports from the EU and US to third countries. The spillover eﬀects
stem from the expectation that TTIP will lead to improved regulatory cooperation
between the EU and the US and that this new regulatory framework will become
a global standard. Harmonisation of regulations will make it less costly to comply
with the ﬁxed costs of exporting to the EU and US market: these costs have to be
incurred only once if regulations are harmonised.
The obvious eﬀect of modelling spillovers is that negative trade diversion eﬀects
on third countries become smaller. The assumption of positive spillover eﬀects is
not uncontroversial. When two countries harmonise standards, they will also re-
place old standards, possibly agreed upon with third countries. This might make it
more diﬃcult for third countries to comply with the new standards, thus generating
cost increases instead of cost reductions. The empirical literature on the scope for
spillover eﬀects is summarised in Baldwin (2014), although he organises the discus-
sion around the concept of "negative trade diversion". When a country signs a deep
FTA it might improve the functioning of its services sector, implement stricter rules
on competition policy and streamline its government procurement, for example. To
a large extent these measures are non-discriminatory in nature, thus also generating
beneﬁts for non-members. The studies cited in Baldwin (2014) indicate that the
scope for negative trade diversion is very limited: in most cases trade with non-FTA
partners also increases when an FTA is signed. This does not provide, however,
conclusive evidence for the presence of direct spillover eﬀects: trade with non-FTA
partners might also increase after an FTA has been signed because countries sign-
ing an FTA might be implementing other types of reforms together with signing an
FTA.
Only Francois et al. (2013) works with direct and indirect spillover eﬀects in their
main simulations, whereas most other studies report the eﬀects of spillovers in the
robustness checks. All studies, however, follow Francois et al. (2013) by assuming
that direct spillovers (third countries exporting to the EU) are 20% of the trade
cost reductions between the EU and the US and indirect spillovers are 10% (third
countries exporting to each other).28
When we analyse the spillover eﬀects, Table 2 shows that the economic eﬀects
of including spillovers varies considerably within studies. Whereas Fontagné et al.
(2013) and Felbermayr et al. (2015) ﬁnd that the spillover eﬀects raise welfare by
about two thirds, the other studies ﬁnd eﬀects in the range of 20% to 25%.29 We can
explain the large eﬀect in Felbermayr et al. (2015) by the way baseline trade costs
28For example, if there is a 5% total trade cost reduction between the EU and US, the direct
spillover (i.e. 20% over total trade costs) will represent an additional 1% total trade cost decrease
for third countries exporting to the US or EU and an additional 0.5% indirect spillover reduction
(i.e. half the size of the direct spillover decrease) for EU and US export costs to third countries and
for trade between third countries.
29The large eﬀects in Fontagné et al. (2013), however, could be explained from the fact that this
study only reports eﬀects rounded to one decimal. While the absolute diﬀerences are less signiﬁcant.
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are modelled in their single-sector model. As discussed below, this approach biases
the eﬀects of trade cost reductions upwards and thus, also the eﬀect of spillovers.
Thus, by excluding both these studies as outliers, we conclude that including 20%
direct and 10% indirect spillovers is expected to have additional welfare increases
on the TTIP-partners of about 25%.
Table 2: Estimated TTIP welfare eﬀects, with and without spillover eﬀects
Without spillovers With spillovers Relative diﬀerence
EU USA EU USA
CEPR study 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.4 20.8%
CEPII study 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 66.7%
Egger et al. 2015 2.3 1.0 3.0 1.1 26.5%
Aichele et al. 2014 2.1 2.7 2.7 3.4 25.4%
Felbermayr et al. 2015 3.9 4.9 7.8 7.1 67.7%
Source: Own estimations based on reported results from cited studies.
6 Summary and conclusions
Average tariﬀ levels have been decreasing steadily after the Second World War.
As a consequence, the relative importance of non-tariﬀ measures has been rising,
and in the latest deep FTAs there has been an special emphasis on how trade
facilitation mechanisms, behind-the-border measures and the harmonisation and
mutual recognition of regulations can yield substantial decreases in NTMs. As such,
the estimation of these potential NTM reductions has become a key variable to
properly estimate the expected economic eﬀects of these deep FTAs.
In this chapter we detailed how NTMs can be calculated using two diﬀerent
estimation techniques: bottom-up or top-down. In particular, we detail and compare
how seven diﬀerent impact assessments of TTIP have estimated the potential trade
cost reductions from this agreement, why there are some signiﬁcant discrepancies
in the cost reduction values, and how these diﬀerences can explain the diﬀerent
expected welfare eﬀects that come out of these studies.
The main ﬁnding of this chapter is that a reliable and transparent estimation
of the NTM trade cost reductions associated with FTAs, is indeed a key issue to
ultimately evaluate these agreements and yield reliable economic impacts. We ﬁnd
that accounting for diﬀerences in the expected NTM reductions can explain a large
share of the discrepancies regarding the overall potential economic eﬀects of TTIP.
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